The Right to Write-In: Voting Rights and the First Amendment by Logan, Michele
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 44 | Issue 3 Article 6
1-1993
The Right to Write-In: Voting Rights and the First
Amendment
Michele Logan
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michele Logan, The Right to Write-In: Voting Rights and the First Amendment, 44 Hastings L.J. 727 (1993).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol44/iss3/6
Notes
The Right to Write-In: Voting Rights and
the First Amendment
by
MICHELE LOGAN*
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the es-
sence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike
at the heart of representative government.'
Although the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee the right to
vote, that right is nevertheless protected under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a fundamental right.2 The right to vote is not absolute, as the
Constitution permits states to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of
Elections."' 3 However, other constitutional provisions limit state regula-
tions; thus, states may not enact election regulations that infringe upon
constitutional rights such as free speech.4
The right to vote implies the concurrent right to choose the person
for whom one votes. 5 The ability to cast a write-in vote6 in lieu of voting
* Member, Third Year Class; B.A. 1990, University of California, Los Angeles. I
would like to thank all those people who have assisted in writing, editing and publishing this
Note. In particular, I wish to thank my father, Trent Logan, who sent me to Washington,
D.C. to hear oral argument on Burdick v. Takushi as added incentive to publish this Note.
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
2. Id. at 554.
3. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.; see Tashjan v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479
U.S. 208 (1986); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
4. Tashjan, 479 U.S. at 217; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1983).
5. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 ("Restrictions on voters' ability to freely vote strike at the
heart of representative government.").
6. For purposes of this Note, "write-in voting" will be defined as any method of voting
for a candidate not on the printed ballot, including handwriting the candidate's name and
using stickers with printed names, as well as any other possible method. Additionally, since a
write-in vote is only effective as "speech" if it is counted and reported, this Note includes
counting and reporting in the definition. See United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386 (1915)
("[It is] unquestionable that the right to have one's vote counted is as open to protection.., as
the right to put a ballot in a box.").
Write-in voting must allow a candidate to actually vote for the candidate he or she
chooses; therefore this Note's definition does not include alternatives such as checking a none-
of-the-above box. Cf Robert Batey, Electoral Graffiti: The Right to Write-In, 5 NOVA L.
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for a slated candidate best reflects a voter's ability to freely choose the
candidate of her choice. Such voting furthers each individual's ability to
express through the election process both her political views and her dis-
satisfaction with the slated candidates or the political process itself. Be-
cause write-in voting ultimately furthers political debate, it is political
speech that is protected by the First Amendment. 7 Because voting-
whether for a slated or write-in candidate-is a vital facet of the political
process and contains an important expressive function, 8 no interest
should be considered sufficiently important to infringe upon either a
voter's freedom of choice or her right to express her views through
voting.
As Americans have become increasingly dissatisfied with both the
Democratic and Republican parties, the ability to express one's political
views through the election process has become more important, whether
or not those views actually carry the day.9 This Note will show that the
importance of political expression through voting, balanced against the
lack of any sufficiently important government interest, leads to the con-
clusion that bans on write-in voting are unconstitutional. 10
Until recently, both federal and state courts were divided on the
constitutionality of laws banning write-in voting.1 Specifically, the fed-
REV. 201 (1981) (advocating the use of a none-of-the-above box on state ballots for states
concerned with avoiding the problems of write-in voting).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 145-171; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (finding that the First Amendment protects political speech).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 145-171.
9. See, e.g., Gerald M. Pomper, The Decline of Partisan Politics, in THE IMPACT OF THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS 13 (Louis Maisel & Joseph Cooper eds., 1977). Considering voters' elec-
toral behavior, it was found that from one-third to two-fifths of all voters disclaim ties to the
major political parties. Id. at 26-27. Based upon these statistics, as well as the "electoral
success of insurgents," it could be deduced that the "political parties have lost their monop-
oly" and it is "quite likely that independents will soon constitute a plurality of the nation. The
parties are disfavored by the voters." Id. at 28-29.
10. Although several states have found a right to "write-in" within their respective state
constitutions, see, e.g., Canaan v. Abdelnour, 710 P.2d 268, 283 (Cal. 1985) (holding a ban on
write-in voting unconstitutional under both the U.S. and California Constitutions), this Note
will focus only on the U.S. Constitution.
11. See generally James L. Isham, Annotation, Elections: Validity of State or Local Legis-
lative Ban on Write-In Votes, 69 A.L.R.4TH 948 (1989) (collecting and analyzing court opin-
ions regarding the validity of bans on write-in voting). Additionally, it should be noted that
several states have recognized the right to write-in under their state constitutions. See, e.g.,
Canaan, 710 P.2d at 283; Littlejohn v. People, 121 P. 159, 165 (Colo. 1912); Smith v.
Smathers, 372 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla. 1979); Thompson v. Willson, 155 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. 1967);
Barr v. Cardell, 155 N.W. 312, 314 (Iowa 1915); Riecker v. Hartmann, 326 A.2d 101, 104-05
(N.J. 1974). In contrast, many other states have either placed restrictions upon or entirely
prohibited write-in voting. See, e.g., Davidson v. Rhea, 256 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Ark. 1953);
Hales v. Langford, 446 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Ky. 1969); Lacombe v. Laborde, 61 So. 518, 520 (La.
1912); McKenzie v. Boykin, 71 So. 382, 384 (Miss. 1916); Appeal of Yerger, 333 A.2d 902,
905-06 (Pa. 1975); Chamberlin v. Wood, 88 N.W. 109 (S.D. 1901); Lydick v. Chairman of
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eral courts of appeals had reached opposing conclusions after analyzing
write-in voting under the U.S. Constitution. In Dixon v. Maryland State
Administrative Board of Election Laws,12 the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that any ban on write-in voting violates the First and Four-
teenth Amendments, 13 whereas in Burdick v. Takushi the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Hawaii's complete refusal to recognize write-
in voting serves a compelling state interest that overrides the voter's First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 14 This conflict, however, was re-
cently resolved. In Burdick v. Takushi15 the Supreme Court upheld the
Ninth Circuit decision that write-in voting is not constitutionally pro-
tected; the Court held that even complete bans on write-in voting do not
unreasonably restrict a voter's interest in free speech. 16
This Note17 argues that the Supreme Court, by holding that voting
does not involve important free speech concerns, failed to properly recog-
nize the importance of free speech and choice in the election process. In
light of growing public concern with incumbents and the political pro-
cess,18 the Supreme Court should reconsider Burdick and find that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments protect write-in voting. Section I of
this Note focuses on the right to vote and its relation to the First Amend-
ment and discusses both the background of that right and the philo-
sophic importance of First Amendment rights in the political arena and
in write-in voting generally. Section II outlines and compares the recent
federal court decisions in both Dixon and Burdick. First it analyzes the
argument in Dixon that write-in voting is a protected right under the
Dallas County Republican Executive Comm., 456 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970);
Burdick v. Takushi, 776 P.2d 824, 825 (Haw. 1989) (upon certification from Ninth Circuit).
12. Dixon v. Maryland Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989).
13. Id. at 786.
14. Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415, 421 (9th Cir. 1991), af'd, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
15. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
16. Id. at 2067-68.
17. This Note will concentrate on a voter's right to cast a write-in vote, as opposed to a
candidate's right to seek election via write-in voting. At the same time, the author recognizes
that the rights of voters and candidates are intertwined. Indeed, the Court has often noted the
effect of election laws on both voters and candidates. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709,
716 (1974) ("The interests involved are not merely those of parties or individual candidates
.... The right of a party or an individual to a place on a ballot is entitled to protection and is
intertwined with the rights of voters."); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) ("[TMhe
rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws
that affect candidates always have some theoretical, correlative effect on voters."); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) ("In the present situation the state laws place burdens on two
different, although overlapping, kinds of rights-the right of individuals to associate for the
advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political
persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.").
Because this Note argues that it is the free speech interests of the voter that need to be
protected, however, the intertwining of interests is less important than in a ballot access case,
where the rights of both the voter and the candidate are impaired.
18. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 156-166.
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First Amendment and restrictions on write-in voting must be subject to
strict scrutiny. Second it examines the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court
decisions in Burdick, in which the courts found that voting does not im-
plicate free speech concerns. The courts held that write-in voting need
only be construed under a reasonable relation test, and that under such a
test a complete ban on write-in voting is both reasonable and constitu-
tional. Finally, Section III asserts that voting contains important speech
value and that restrictions on the franchise should be subject to a strict
scrutiny test. It proposes that under such a test both the right to vote
and the First Amendment lead to an absolute right to write-in voting
despite states' interests in regulating elections. This Note concludes that
the Supreme Court's decision in Burdick is wrong.
I. The Constitutional Rights to Vote and to Free Speech
In order to understand the constitutional value of write-in voting, it
is first necessary to consider the background of both the right to vote and
the right to free speech. Additionally, it is helpful to relate these two
rights to one another.
A. The Right to Vote and Election Regulations
The U.S. Constitution neither explicitly guarantees the right to vote
nor specifies how states must run their elections. 19 It does establish the
right of people qualified under state law to cast their votes and have them
counted free from interference in primary and general congressional elec-
tions.20 Despite the lack of an explicit general right to vote, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognizes such a right, based upon the Fourteenth
Amendment. 21 The Supreme Court has stated that:
Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right of
all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections. A
consistent line of decisions by this Court in cases involving attempts to
deny or restrict the right of suffrage has made this indelibly clear. It
has been repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a constitu-
19. See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1111, 1117
(1975). The only express provisions of the U.S. Constitution regarding voting rights are found
in article I, section 2 (stating the right of qualified men to vote); the Fifteenth Amendment
(prohibiting discrimination regarding voting rights on account of color, race, or slavery); the
Twenty-fourth Amendment (prohibiting requirement of a poll tax before allowing a person to
vote); and the Twenty-sixth Amendment (prohibiting discrimination regarding the voting
rights of any person over the age of eighteen). Id.
20. Id. at 1118.
21. Id. This right can be construed as comprehending three basic principles: (1) statutory
exclusions of some individuals from voting must be supported by compelling state interests; (2)
actions that intend to dilute votes of a class of voters under color of state laws are unconstitu-
tional; and (3) the weight of an individual's vote cannot depend upon whether he or she is part
of an identifiable minority group or where he or she lives. Id. at 1118-19.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
tionally protected right to vote... and to have their votes counted
22
The lack of an explicit right to vote, coupled with the Constitution's
grant to the states of the authority to regulate the "Times, Places, and
Manner" 23 of federal elections subject to congressional oversight,24 gives
the states substantial power over federal elections and nearly complete
control over state elections.25 For example, the states may decide who
may vote,26 how voting is conducted, and when and where that voting
will take place.27 Such state regulations preserve order rather than al-
lowing chaos to accompany the democratic process; these kinds of regu-
lations present the people with understandable choices by organizing and
clarifying elections. 28
Despite the states' broad power to regulate elections, their authority
is not absolute under federal law. A state must not infringe upon other
constitutional rights-such as free speech and equal protection-in its
election regulations.29 For example, the Court has held unconstitutional
laws that infringe upon a candidate's ability to be placed upon the ballot;
such ballot access laws burden the free speech and equal protection rights
of political parties and their members. 30 Additionally, the Court has es-
tablished specific guidelines for determining when a state law has vio-
lated the First Amendment.31
22. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (citations omitted) (collecting cases).
23. U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1.
24. Id.
25. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1970) (Black, J.) ("IT]he Framers of
the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amend-
ment, the power to regulate elections.") (footnote omitted).
26. See, eg., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (holding valid a law requiring
enrollment at least 30 days before the general election in order to vote in primary elections);
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (holding refusal to grant absen-
tee ballots to county inmates constitutional).
27. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959)
("States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which
the right of suffrage may be exercised.") (citations omitted).
28. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974).
29. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966) (states have the right to set voter
qualifications, but may not contravene any other constitutional provisions); RICHARD
CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROcEss 268 (1970) ("[The fUree
speech and press guarantees of the First Amendment limit the authority of the states to regu-
late electioneering.").
30. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229 (1989).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 75-90.
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B. The Historical Background to Write-In Voting
Voters "traditionally enjoyed the right to cast write-in votes or their
equivalents for the candidates of their choice."3 2 Indeed, whether states
could restrict write-in voting did not become an issue in democratic elec-
tions until the advent of the "Australian ballot" in the late nineteenth
century. 33
Prior to the Australian ballot, voters were not limited as to the can-
didates for whom they could vote. 34 Two voting methods were em-
ployed: (1) voice voting systems35 and (2) paper balloting systems.
Under paper balloting systems, voters prepared their own ballots, or al-
ternatively, used a ticket pre-printed by a political party.3 6 States neither
closely regulated ballot access nor mandated nominating procedures,37
thus allowing voters to freely choose for whom they voted. For all prac-
tical purposes, these paper ballots constituted write-in votes.38 This prac-
tice, however, at best was chaotic and at worst led to fraudulent ballot
practices "riddled with abuses: bribery, indirect bribery through official
fees, intimidation, [and] party assessments .... ,,39
In the late nineteenth century, the Australian ballot was introduced
to solve the problems of these corrupt election practices.4 The Austra-
lian ballot was intended to reduce party corruption, improve voter se-
crecy and therefore free choice, and protect the integrity of the election
process. 41 Kentucky became the first state to use the Australian ballot
32. David L. Permut & Joseph P. Verdon, Note, Protecting the American Tradition of
Write-In Voting After Burdick v. Takushi, 9 J. L. & POL. 185, 188 (1992).
33. An Australian ballot is a state-prepared ballot that allows for secret voting. L.E.
FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: THE STORY OF AMERICAN REFORM ix (1968). The
four principles of the Australian ballot are: (1) it is provided by the state; (2) it is a facsimile
ballot that (3) contains all the names of all nominated candidates; and (4) voters vote in an
enclosed, secret booth. Id. at 126. The Australian ballot has also been defined as an official
ballot on which the candidates' names are printed and which is accompanied by safeguards
designed to maintain secrecy during voting. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 132 (6th ed. 1990).
34. See generally Permut & Verdon, supra note 32, at 188-96 (surveying the history of
American voting procedures).
35. Voice voting was generally rejected by the time of the Civil War. See FREDMAN,
supra note 33, at 20.
36. FREDMAN, supra note 33, at 20-21.
37. Permut & Verdon, supra note 32, at 190 n.26.
38. John F. Reynolds and Richard L. McCormick, Outlawing "Treachery". Split Tickets
and Ballot Laws in New York and New Jersey, 1880-1910, 72 J. AM. HIST. 835, 844 (1986).
39. FREDMAN, supra note 33, at 22.
40. Id. at ix. See generally JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM AS
EMBODIED IN THE LEGISLATION OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES (2d ed. 1889) (describing the pro-
gress of the Australian ballot movement and chronicling the history of the Australian ballot as
it arose in Australia and was adopted in Europe, Canada, and the United States).
41. Id. at 10 ("[It] virtually terminated bribery, lavish treating, and disorder at
elections.").
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for local elections in 1888;42 in that same year Massachusetts enacted a
state law requiring state prepared ballots.43 By 1892 thirty-eight states
had passed some variation of the Australian ballot law.44
The advent of Australian ballots was not without problems: It nar-
rowly restricted the voter's previously held right to freely vote for whom-
ever suited her personal preferences. Recognizing this problem, many
state courts found the right to cast a write-in vote in their state laws. 45
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts summarized:
[I]t may be said that the so-called 'Australian Ballot Acts', in the vari-
ous forms in which they have been enacted .... have been sustained by
the courts, provided the acts permit the voter to vote for such persons
as he please, by leaving blank spaces on the official ballot, in which he
may write, or insert in any other proper manner, the names of such
persons, and by giving him the means, and a reasonable opportunity,
to write in or insert such names.46
Shortly after the advent of the Australian ballot, automated voting
machines were developed. Such automated systems were adopted by
many states as a means of efficiently implementing the Australian bal-
lot.47 Voting machines save money and time during the election process;
write-in voting undermines the efficiency of voting machines because
those votes must be hand-counted.
Nevertheless, state courts have continued to protect write-in voting.
For example, in Jackson v. Norris,48 the Maryland Court of Appeals held
unconstitutional a contract to buy automated voting machines that failed
to provide for a write-in vote.49 The court reasoned that such machines
"denied to a qualified voter the right to vote for any person of his choice,
because the voter must vote either for the candidates whose names are
printed upon the voting machine ballot or not vote."' 50 Today, at least
twenty-four state statutes require that voting machines allow write-in
votes.51
42. Id. at 31.
43. Id. at 38-39.
44. Id. at 83.
45. See, eg., Littlejohn v. Desch, 121 P. 159, 162 (Colo. 1912); Barr v. Cardell, 155 N.W.
312, 315 (Iowa 1915); Snortum v. Homme, 119 N.W. 59, 60 (Minn. 1909); Mayor of Jackson
v. State, 59 So. 873, 875 (Miss. 1912); Park v. Rives, 119 P. 1034, 1036 (Utah 1911); cf. Batey,
supra note 6, at 206 n.31.
46. Cole v. Tucker, 41 N.E. 681 (Mass. 1895).
47. Permut & Verdon, supra note 32 at 194.
48. 195 A.2d 576 (Md. 1937).
49. Id. at 586.
50. Id. at 581-82.
51. Permut & Verdon, supra note 32, at 196 n.62 (collecting statutes).
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Currently, while some states have recognized that their constitu-
tions protect write-in voting, many states place restrictions upon it.52
Further, a few states ban the practice completely.5 3
C. First Amendment and Free Expression in Relation to Voting
The U.S. Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... -54 Under Supreme
Court doctrine, the First Amendment applies to the states, as well as to
Congress, through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 55
The First Amendment's purposes and functions are varied. Never-
theless, Justice Brandeis has concisely described its basic principles: 6
Those who won our independence ... believed that freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a funda-
mental principle of American government. 57
Numerous First Amendment theories exist, ranging from public en-
lightenment 58 and free trade in the marketplace of ideas59 to social stabil-
ity60 and an ability to participate in understanding the problems of self-
government. 6I Yet as diverse as these theories are, each protects political
speech. 62
52. See supra note 11.
53. Complete prohibitions on write-in voting remain in at least three states besides Ha-
waii. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 24-293.270(2) (1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 7-127(1) (1991);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 12-16-1 (1982 & Supp. 1990).
54. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
55. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding state statute infringed upon
freedom of press guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925) (assuming application of First Amendment through Fourteenth Amendment to state
action).
56. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.01 (1984).
57. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled
by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
58. NIMMER, supra note 56, at § 1.02.
59. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
60. Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 647, 672-73
("Those who are resentful because their interests are not accorded fair weight, and who may be
doubly resentful because they have not even a chance to present those interests, may seek to
attain.., radical changes .... Thus, liberty of expression, though often productive of divi-
siveness, may contribute to social stability.").
61. The purpose of the First Amendment "is to give to every voting member of the body
politic the fullest possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which the
citizen of a self-governing society must deal." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREE-
DOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 75 (1965).
62. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the First Amendment only protects
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The most famous defense of free speech was articulated by Justice
Holmes, who wrote that the best test of truth is the power of thought to
get itself accepted in the marketplace of ideas. Freedom of speech brings
out the truth and best serves liberty because truth is the only ground
upon which the people's wishes can be carried out.63 More narrowly,
George Mason, the First Amendment's principal source and author,64
envisioned free speech solely as a means of protecting against the ex-
cesses of self-interested governors. 65 A similarly narrow view has been
espoused by Alexander Meiklejohn, who wrote that free speech is pro-
tected by the First Amendment because it is essential to intelligent self-
government in a democratic society. 66 His view limits the First Amend-
ment's special guarantees to public discussion of important civic issues
and grants protection (albeit absolute) only to political speech. 67
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has noted the overriding impor-
tance of political speech within First Amendment doctrine, stating, "We
have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance. It is speech on 'matters of public concern' that is 'at the
heart of the First Amendment's protection.' 6s Indeed, the Supreme
Court has only recently recognized free speech interests outside the
sphere of political discourse, and despite such recognition, treats such
interests as "less important. ' 69 Under such a hierarchy, political speech
retains primary importance.70 Thus, the Court has endeavored in First
political speech. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech-An
Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 300 (1978).
63. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
64. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and Its Philosophical Roots, in THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT, THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 132 (T. Daniel Shumate ed., 1987).
65. Id. at 135.
66. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 786 (2d ed.
1988) (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF Gov-
ERNMENT (1948)).
67. TRIBE, supra note 66, § 12-1 at 786 (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948)).
68. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985)
(footnote and citations omitted).
69. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 770, 771-72 n.24 (1976) (holding commercial advertising is speech protected by the
First Amendment, although "a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the
flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired"); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61-63, 72-73 (1976) (Stevens, J., plurality) (allowing restric-
tions on a speech interest in borderline obscenity that the Court finds is "less vital" than "the
free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance").
70. Young, 427 U.S. at 70 ("[I]t is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type
of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled
political debate."); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial
speech occupies a "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values"); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc, 472 U.S. at 758, 761 (private speech is not protected by the "actual malice"
standard, in part because "not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance").
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Amendment doctrine to retain a "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open." 71
Ultimately, First Amendment theories-from absolute protection to
the intentionalist reading-recognize the importance of fostering free and
healthy political discourse.72 At its most basic, free speech represents the
need for untrammeled political debate. In what clearer manner can citi-
zens express their political views than through an unobstructed voting
process? The First Amendment must protect the ability of citizens to
speak about their representatives and the state of their government. 73
Voting for the candidate of one's choice should be of primary importance
in the protection of political speech as it provides the most basic mecha-
nism for each citizen to participate in political debate and express her
political opinions.74 As a mechanism of political debate, write-in voting
directly implicates both the right to vote and free speech concerns.
D. When the State Right to Regulate Voting Collides with the First
Amendment
In order to determine whether a voting regulation intrudes upon an
individual's right to free speech, the courts have developed a balancing
test that was first set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze.75 This test balances
the voter's right to free speech against the state's interest in regulating
elections.
In Anderson, Presidential candidate John Anderson and three voters
challenged the constitutionality of Ohio's early filing deadline for in-
dependent candidates who wished to be placed on the ballot, claiming
that the deadline placed an unconstitutional burden upon their right to
vote and their right to free speech.76 The suit stemmed from Ohio's re-
fusal to include Anderson on the November 1980 general election bal-
lot.77 Upon Anderson's April 24th announcement of his intention to run
for President as an independent candidate, his Ohio supporters gathered
14,500 signatures for a nominating petition. 78 The petition was tendered
to the state on May 16. Ohio refused the petition, relying on a state
statute that required an independent candidate to file such a petition at
71. Young, 427 U.S. at 65.
72. See generally Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (recognizing that a major pur-
pose of the First Amendment is to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, includ-
ing discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which
government is or should be operated, and other similar matters related to the political process).
73. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 145-171.
75. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
76. Id. at 783.
77. Id. at 782.
78. Id.
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least seventy-five days before the primary election immediately preceding
the general election.79
Recognizing the need for some regulation on voting, the Court em-
phasized that questions involving the right to vote cannot be resolved by
a "litmus paper test," but instead must be settled through balancing com-
peting interests.80 The Court must:
[F]irst consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to
[First Amendment] rights; ... then identify.., and evaluate the pre-
cise interests put forward by the State as justifications[; finally,] ... the
Court must... determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those
interests and [the]... extent to which... [they] make it necessary to
burden... [First Amendment] rights.81
While Anderson involved ballot access, similar concerns arise in the
area of write-in voting: Regulations should neither infringe upon polit-
ical opportunity nor impose too heavy a burden on smaller parties and
voters whose views fall outside the major and existing political parties
and candidates. Thus, the Supreme Court has applied this test to write-
in voting questions.82
Importantly, to apply Anderson it is necessary to establish how
weighty the government's interests must be in order to overcome a
voter's interest in free speech.8 3 Typically, the Court has required a
strong interest in order to justify infringement on First Amendment
rights.84 In Norman v. Reed, the Court considered the application of
Anderson to the question of ballot access by a new political party.85 The
Court stated that when First Amendment interests and voting rights col-
lide, the voting interests must be "sufficiently weighty to justify the limi-
tation.., and we have accordingly required any severe restriction to be
narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. '8 6
In Burdick, the Court construed Norman to hold that when Anderson is
applied to a regulation that "severely restricts" voting rights, the regula-
tion must be narrowly drawn to advance state interests of compelling
importance in order to withstand scrutiny.8 7
The Court in Burdick also, however, flatly denied the use of strict
scrutiny in write-in voting cases, determining that voting did not contain
79. Id. at 782-83.
80. Id at 789.
81. Id.
82. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2063 (1992).
83. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698, 705 (1992).
84. David H. Bathe, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views Regarding First Amendment
Guarantees of Freedom of Speech or of the Press as Applied to Electoral or Referendum Process,
71 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1002 (1983) (summarizing the Supreme Court's treatment of free speech in
relation to election and voting regulations).
85. Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 705.
86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063-64.
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sufficient free speech value.88 When the burden on free speech rights is
small, the Court merely considers if the burden is reasonable. 89 This
Note argues that such a "reasonable" test is inappropriate in the write-in
voting context, as voting does involve important free political speech val-
ues and those free speech elements are heavily burdened by a restriction
or ban on write-in voting. As detailed below, strict scrutiny should apply
to write-in voting cases. 90
II. A Constitutional Right to Write-In in Federal Courts
Although federal courts have begun recognizing write-in voting's re-
lationship to the right to vote and the right of free speech, they have
come up with widely divergent results which remained in conflict until
recently. Before the Supreme Court decided Burdick, at least four fed-
eral courts had invalidated restrictions on write-in voting as violating the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. 9 1 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit
found Hawaii's complete ban on and refusal to report the results of write-
in voting constitutional. 92 Finally, in 1992, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit decision, holding a complete ban on write-in voting did
not unconstitutionally burden First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 93
A. Finding the Right to Write-In: Dixon v. Maryland State Administrative
Board of Election Laws
Prior to the 1987 Maryland election, two members of the Socialist
Workers Party, Reba Williams Dixon and Dana Burroughs, attempted
to file certificates of candidacy as write-in candidates. 94 Their certificates
were rejected because they refused to pay a $150 filing fee. 95 The regula-
tions that required this fee essentially treated write-in candidates as
though they were slated candidates by, among other things, requiring a
fee and making the candidates eligible for benefits from the Fair Cam-
88. Id. at 2066.
89. Id. at 2063-64.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 145-171.
91. Burdick v. Takushi, 737 F. Supp. 582 (D. Haw. 1990), rev'd, 937 F.2d 415 (9th Cir.
1991), affid, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992); Paul v. Indiana Election Bd., 743 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ind.
1990); Socialist Labor Party v. Rhodes, 290 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Ohio 1968), afld in part and
modified in part sub nom. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1984) (the Supreme Court did not
address the write-in voting question because no appeal was taken from that portion of the
lower court decision); Dixon v. Maryland Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776 (4th
Cir. 1989).
92. Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1991).
93. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2067 (1992).
94. Dixon v. Maryland Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 686 F. Supp. 539 (D. Md. 1988),
rev'd, 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989).
95. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 4A-6 (1986).
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paign Financing Fund.96 After this rejection, Dixon and Burroughs,
joined by voters Edwin B. Fruit and Margaret Mary Kreiner, fied suit in
the district court for the District of Maryland, claiming that the imposi-
tion of a filing fee and Maryland's refusal to report write-in votes violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 97
Initially, the district court denied a preliminary injunction. Then, in
an opinion handed down June 13, 1988, the district court considered
whether the filing fee was constitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 98 The court granted summary
judgment to the State of Maryland, finding that the filing fee was ration-
ally related to a legitimate state interest in discouraging frivolous
candidacies. 99
The plaintiffs then appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which reversed the lower court's decision and invalidated the statute.
The Fourth Circuit held that the statute unconstitutionally interfered
with the voters' right to elect candidates of their choice. 1°°
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the $150 filing fee directly affected
voters who support write-in candidates, since it is through association
with and voting for write-in candidates that voters may most effectively
express their political preferences. 01 The court recognized both that the
rights of voters and candidates are intertwined and that laws limiting the
field of candidates from which voters can choose effectively restricts their
fundamental right to a meaningful vote.102 Additionally, the court stated
that under Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,10 3
this direct infringement upon First Amendment rights will only survive if
the restrictions serve a compelling state interest under the First Amend-
ment analysis outlined in Anderson.' ° 4
Applying the Anderson criteria, the court found that the importance
of debate on public issues defined the character and high magnitude of
injury to voters' First Amendment rights.10 5 First, the court explained
that write-in voters "cast their ballots as they do in the hope, however
slim, that their votes will succeed as efforts to propagate their views, and
so increase their influence."10 6 The court went on to state that such re-
96. Dixon v. Maryland Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776, 777-78 (4th Cir.
1989).
97. Id. at 778.
98. Dixon, 686 F. Supp. at 539.
99. Id. at 542.
100. Dixon, 878 F.2d at 786.
101. Id. at 781.
102. Id. at 779.
103. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
104. Dixon, 878 F.2d at 780.
105. Id. at 780-82.
106. Id. at 782.
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strictions upon the persons for whom voters may vote are "no different in
effect from refusing to allow them to cast their ballots in the first
place."10 7 Second, the court found that the state's interests in defraying
costs and assuring that only serious candidates are accorded official sta-
tus were insufficient reasons to infringe upon voters' rights.10 8 The
state's interests did not outweigh the voters' interests in free speech and
choice in elections.10 9
Ultimately, the court held that Maryland's statute making the re-
porting of write-in results conditional on candidate certification infringed
upon voters' First Amendment rights and failed to serve a compelling
state interest.' O
B. Denying the Constitutional Right to Write-In: Burdick v. Takushi
In June 1986, Alan Burdick notified Hawaii's Director of Elections
Morris Takushi and its Lieutenant Governor John Waihee that he
wished to cast a write-in vote in an upcoming election."' Takushi and
Waihee, however, informed Burdick that Hawaii election laws did not
provide for such a procedure and that his write-in votes would be either
disallowed or ignored." 12 Following this notice, Burdick filed suit in fed-
eral district court claiming that such a ban violated the U.S.
Constitution.
(1) The Federal Court Decisions
Initially, the federal district court granted summary judgment in
Burdick's favor, holding that failure to provide for write-in voting vio-
lated Burdick's rights of freedom of expression and association. 1 3 The
district court issued a preliminary injunction directing Hawaii to provide
such procedures. 114
In 1987 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first heard this case,
upon appeal by the State of Hawaii.' 5 The Ninth Circuit vacated and
remanded the district court's judgment with instructions to abstain from
deciding federal questions until the state court determined whether Ha-
waii election laws actually permitted write-in voting." 16 Upon certifica-
107. Id. at 782-83.
108. Id. at 783-84.
109. Id. at 786.
110. Id.
111. Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415, 416 (9th Cir. 1991), aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
112. Id.
113. Burdick v. Takushi, 846 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1988).
114. Burdick, 937 F.2d at 416-17.
115. Burdick, 846 F.2d at 587.
116. Id. at 589 (based on the Pullman abstention doctrine).
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tion, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that Hawaii's election laws
prohibited write-in voting.117
Subsequently, in 1990, the district court again issued a preliminary
injunction directing Hawaii to provide for the casting and counting of
write-in votes, then stayed the injunction pending appeal. 118 The district
court held that the prohibition of write-in voting was a violation of the
U.S. Constitution, basing its decision in part upon Dixon.119
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court 120 and held that Ha-
waii's prohibition on write-in voting serves legitimate state purposes and
therefore does not impose an impermissible burden on Burdick's First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 121 The court based its decision on
the fact that Article I, Section 4, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution gives
states the right to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections, and
upon application of the Anderson balancing test. 122
Unlike the Dixon court, which found the ban directly infringed
upon the content of voters' speech, the Ninth Circuit found that the
write-in voting ban was content-neutral, and only indirectly infringed
upon First Amendment rights. Thus, there was no substantial burden
placed upon a voter's right to participate in elections. 123 Since access to
ballots in Hawaii was simple and straightforward, and since voters had
alternative forums in which to express their political opinions, at most
the ban on write-in voting was a minor infringement of First Amendment
rights.1 24 The restriction need only be reasonable. 125
Applying the second step of the Anderson analysis, the court recog-
nized three important state interests in support of a ban on write-in vot-
ing: "political stability, voter education, and protecting the internal
structure of the State's election laws."'126 The court then found that these
state interests justified any burden upon the voters' interest in free choice,
and reversed the district court decision.' 27
117. Burdick v. Takushi, 776 P.2d 824, 825 (Haw. 1989).
118. Burdick v. Takushi, 737 F. Supp. 582, 592-93 (D. Haw. 1990), rev'd, 927 F.2d 469
(1991).
119. I L at 590-93.
120. The Ninth Circuit heard the appeal on November 5, 1990. An opinion was filed on
March 1, 1991, and then withdrawn by order on June 28, 1991. A new opinion was filed along
with the order, and, at the same time, Burdick's petition for rehearing was denied and sugges-
tion of a rehearing en banc was rejected. Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415, 415-17 (9th Cir.
1991).
121. Id. at 421.
122. Id. at 418.
123. Id. at 418-20.
124. Id. at 419.
125. Id.
126. Id at 420.
127. Id at 416, 421-22.
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(2) The Supreme Court Decision
Burdick appealed the Ninth Circuit decision, and after granting a
writ of certiorari, 128 the Supreme Court handed down an opinion in June
1992.129 The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit and held that taken as
part of Hawaii's election scheme, the complete ban on write-in voting
was constitutional and did not unreasonably restrict free speech. 130
First, the Court rejected the use of strict scrutiny in write-in voting
cases. 3 1 States retain the power to regulate their own elections, and
"common sense" dictates that as a practical matter government must
regulate elections for them to remain fair and honest. 132 Moreover, since
all regulations infringe upon voters' rights, "the mere fact that a State's
system 'creates barriers.., tending to limit the field of candidates from
which voters might choose . . . does not of itself compel close scru-
tiny.' ",133 Instead, the Court held that the proper standard against
which to measure Hawaii's ban on write-in voting was the Anderson test
as applied by the Ninth Circuit, merely looking for a reasonable relation
rather than requiring strict scrutiny.1 34 Applying Anderson, the Court
first determined the extent to which Hawaii's ban burdened voters' First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Since Anderson dictates that the
"rigorousness of ... [the Court's] inquiry" depends upon the extent to
which First Amendment rights are burdened, 135 the Court reiterated that
when "reasonable, nondiscriminatory" regulations are at issue, a state's
regulatory concerns will be sufficient to justify the regulations. 136
The Court then went on to find that Hawaii's ban on write-in voting
did not unreasonably burden a voter's free-speech rights, 37 because the
ease of ballot access in Hawaii meant that the burden imposed was very
limited. 138 Additionally, the Court stated that voting was not an impor-
tant speech function: "[T]he function of the election process is 'to win-
now out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates,' . . . not to
provide a means of giving vent to 'short-range political goals, pique, or
personal quarrel[s].' "139 Under Anderson, the Court concluded that Ha-
waii's election laws only imposed a limited burden on voters' right to free
128. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 635 (1991).
129. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059 (1992).
130. Id. at 2067-68.
131. Id. at 2062-63.
132. Id. at 2063.
133. Id. (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).
134. Id. For an explanation of the Anderson standard, see supra text accompanying notes
75-90.
135. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2063.
136. Id. at 2063-64.
137. Id. at 2066.
138. Id. at 2065.
139. Id. (citations omitted).
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choice and political association and therefore the state's interests need
not be compelling. 14°
Second, the Court considered the strength of the state's interests in
banning write-in voting. Hawaii's interest in avoiding "unrestrained fac-
tionalism" in the general elections was alone sufficient to justify Hawaii's
ban on write-in voting.14 1 The Court went on, however, to state that
Hawaii's concern with party raiding also justifies a ban on write-in vot-
ing. 142 Since write-in voting is a reasonable method of furthering these
two goals, Hawaii's ban on that practice is constitutional despite the bur-
den it imposes on free speech.1 43
Ultimately, the Court narrowly defined the right to vote as "the
right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured
to maintain the integrity of the democratic system," 144 thus taking the
right to express one's political opinions through voting outside of First
Amendment protection.
HI. Resolving the Conflict
The Supreme Court is mistaken in its decision that voting lacks im-
portant political and expressive functions. The Court, lost in considering
the practical efficiency of Hawaii's election process, failed to recognize
the important speech value implicit in voting and the ensuing First
Amendment requirement of free choice in a democratic election process.
A. The Important Speech Value of Voting
Burdick was wrongly decided. While the Court was correct in ap-
plying the Anderson test to write-in voting, it mistakenly cast the right to
vote as purely an attempt to "winnow out candidates."14 5 The Court
failed to appreciate and uphold the equally important expressive func-
tions of voting.
Write-in voting should be constitutionally protected because voting
contains an important expressive function-elections give voters a
chance to effectively guide government by expressing opinions regarding
public policy and the political process. 146 The ability to vote for an alter-
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2066-67.
143. Id. at 2067.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2066.
146. Do ELECTIONS MATTER? 4 (Benjamin Ginsberg & Alan Stone eds., 2d ed. 1991)
(elections institutionalize mass political influence and at the same time constrain and delimit
the effects of mass intervention into political life). Contra David W. Brady & Joseph Stewart,
Jr., When Elections Really Matter, in Do ELECTIONS MATTER?, supra at 79 (suggesting that
rarely do elections actually influence government policy making).
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native, write-in candidate, as opposed to the traditional major party can-
didate, decidedly furthers voters' ability to express their political views,
since "throughout our history, 'by voicing grievances and by proposing
panaceas, third parties have exerted significant influence upon the poli-
cies and programs of major parties.' 147 As an exercise in mass commu-
nication, voting creates a network through which the voice of the people
can be heard. 148
Public participation in politics through voters' ability to express
opinions regarding the government is severely restricted by a state's fail-
ure to provide for write-in voting. Importantly, the desire to be re-
elected motivates politicians to implement policies promoted by the vot-
ers.149 Moreover, elections formalize and alter the character of popular
influence on government actions, help to equalize citizens' capacities to
influence government officials, and substitute participation in leadership
selection for direct popular intervention in government policy-making
and implementation. 150 Without the ability to write-in a vote, voters
who wish to express untraditional views lack the ability to use voting to
influence government and politicians. Thus, because elections both em-
power officials by granting them the right to govern, and guide those
officials in setting public policy, voters should be able to choose freely the
candidates they support. By depriving voters who do not support slated
candidates of the ability to express their own opinions through write-in
voting, the state deprives voters of both an important outlet for political
speech and the ability to participate in influencing government.
Additionally, a ban on write-in voting unconstitutionally burdens
voters' right to vote at the same time that it burdens their First Amend-
ment rights. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the
right to vote, describing it as "fundamental."' 5' The Court has
commented:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice
in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citi-
zens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the
right to vote is undermined. 152
A ban on write-in voting undermines the fundamental right to vote be-
cause it restricts voters' ability to vote freely. Importantly, constitutional
scholar Laurence Tribe notes that at the core of the right to vote is a
concern with the election process as both a source and a product of our
federal scheme of government; all voting-related rights are rights to par-
147. Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual
Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 97 (1984).
148. CLAUDE, supra note 29, at 1-2.
149. IAIN MCLEAN, DEALING IN VOTES 92-93 (1982).
150. Do ELECTIONS MATTER?, supra note 146, at 3-4.
151. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964) (collecting cases).
152. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
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ticipate in this process.15 3 Further, the right to vote relates to the First
Amendment's guarantee that an individual be allowed to participate in
the most general communicative processes (i.e., elections) that determine
the contours of our social and political thought.1 54 The right to vote is at
its core the right to communicate. Without the ability to vote freely,
voters are unable to meaningfully participate in that communicative pro-
cess, and the fundamental right to vote is impaired at its core.
Ultimately, the lack of write-in voting procedures effectively allows
the state to limit for whom voters may vote; by narrowing the field of
choices, the state in essence deprives voters of free, meaningful choice. 155
It has been said that "[the right to vote is the right to choose the person
for whom the ballot is cast. The election is not free if the elector may not
make this choice."156 Without write-in voting, voters lack free choice
and a voice in their government; both their right to vote and their right
to free speech are impaired.
The importance of voting for the candidate of one's own choice,
rather than for the majority parties' slated candidates, is highlighted by
the growing importance of minority and independent candidates in gen-
eral elections. Beginning in Williams v. Rhodes,157 the Court recognized
the need for access to the ballot by new as well as old political parties. In
that case, the Court stated that:
The right to form a party for the advancement of political goals means
little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus denied an
equal opportunity to win votes. So also, the right to vote is heavily
burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of two parties at a time
when other parties are clamoring for a place on the ballot.158
It was estimated as long ago as 1984 that over one-third of the vot-
ing population tended to affiliate with non-traditional political parties
and candidates.1 59 Further the voters' interest in non-traditional polit-
ical candidates can be seen in the emergence in the past fifteen to twenty
years of independent and minority party candidates as evidenced by John
Anderson's 1980 candidacy for President, Ron Packard's election to
Congress in 1982 as a write-in candidate, James Buckley's election to the
Senate as an independent candidate in 1970, and James Longely's elec-
153. TRIBE, supra note 66, § 13-1 at 1062.
154. Id.
155. Indeed, the fact that the Australian ballot took away voters' rights to freely choose
for whom they would vote led a number of state courts in the late nineteenth century to uphold
the right to write-in candidates despite the introduction of the Australian ballot. See supra text
accompanying notes 32-53.
156. Dixon v. Maryland Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776, 785 n.13 (4th Cir.
1989) (quoting Jackson v. Norris, 195 A. 576, 586 (Md. 1937)).
157. 393 U.S. 31 (1968).
158. Id. at 23.
159. Choper, supra note 147, at 96-97.
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tion as Maine Governor in 1974 as an independent candidate. 60 Addi-
tionally, both Mario Cuomo's (albeit unwilling) write-in campaign,16' as
well as Ross Perot's recent independent bid for the Presidency, 62 cer-
tainly sent a message to the present government about voter dissatisfac-
tion with slated candidates as well as government policy. 63 A less
publicized, but no less important, example of the expressive value of
write-in voting can be seen in Ralph Nader's write-in campaign before
the 1992 New Hampshire Primary.164 Nader's goal was not to win the
candidacy, but rather to ignite a national movement and "send a
message."' 65  Finally, Ross Perot's continuing "United We Stand
America" efforts have provided yet another indication of America's
growing interest in alternatives to the major political parties. 166
Despite the importance of allowing free expression of voter opinion
and public participation in politics, the need to confer some restrictions is
160. Id.
161. Campaign Watch: Cuomo Gains, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 5, 1992, at A10 ("New York
Governor Mario Cuomo, who has adamantly said he is not running for president, has climbed
into third place among Democrats as a write-in candidate in New Hampshire's first-in-the-
nation primary .. "); Cathleen Decker, Group in New Hampshire Still Tries to Write Cuomo
Into Race, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1992, at A16.
162. See Sonni Efron & J. Michael Kennedy, Angry Voters See Perot Riding in Like Cav-
alry; Campaign: Texas Billionaire Strikes a Chord with Petitioners Weary of the Usual Political
Roundup, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1992, at Al ("Perot has said he will run for President as an
independent only if 'ordinary people' want him badly enough to place his name on the ballot in
all 50 states."); Richard Simon, Write-In Votes for Perot Will Not Count, Election Officials Say,
L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1992, at BI (because Perot failed to meet the deadline to qualify as a
write-in candidate and because of "Perot's mushrooming popularity," Los Angeles County
had to change its ballot counting procedures).
163. See generally Effron & Kennedy, supra note 162, at A l (voters are increasingly dissat-
isfied with current politics, and hope for "a populist cowboy on a white horse who will gallop
into town, round up all the rascals, ride corruption out and return control to the people");
Demo Voters Express Desire for Someone Else, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 8, 1992, at A19 ("Demo-
cratic voters favored Bill Clinton in yesterday's presidential primaries but sent strong signals of
dissatisfaction ... [and] yearn[ed] for other choices."); Campaign Watch: Can't Get No Satis-
faction, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 3, 1992, at A2 ("A Times Mirror Poll shows that 66 percent of the
people are dissatisfied with all of the presidential candidates ...."); Ronald Brownstein, The
Times Poll: 21% Say They'd Vote for Perot in 3-Way Race, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1992, at Al
("Signaling widespread dissatisfaction with the choices in the presidential contest, fully one-
fifth of registered voters say they would support [Perot].").
164. Jerry Roberts, Write-In Candidate Nader Drawing the Biggest Crowds, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 5, 1992, at A2.
165. Id. (Nader stated that "[the pileup of write-in votes in New Hampshire will let them
know there's a voter revolt .... When push comes to shove, the politicians still fear the people
when they're informed and organized.").
166. David S. Broder, Perot Is Watching Grass Roots Grow, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1992,
at Al ("[Perot's organization] has amassed a donor base and membership that apparently is
larger than the million or so donors the Democratic and Republican national committees each
had last year."); Thomas B. Edsall, Perot Steps Back Into Limelight, WASH. POST, Jan. 12,
1993, at A10 ("The purpose of United We Stand ... will be 'to recreate a government that
comes from the people, not at the people.' ").
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also vital to democracy, as "completely unlimited voting could subvert
the ideal of popular rule which democracy so ardently embraces. '167
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that restrictions on who can
vote and how they can vote are bounded by the Constitution itself: Re-
strictions on the franchise may not abrogate other constitutional guaran-
tees such as free speech. 168 And, when voting regulations heavily burden
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court just last term required the regu-
lation to be narrowly tailored. 169
Voting, which strikes at the heart of both free speech and protection
of "uninhibited, robust, and wide open" debate of public issues, 170 is the
epitome of political expression. As political speech, it therefore must fol-
low that write-in voting, which embodies free choice, should fall under
the First Amendment's strongest protections. And so protected, regula-
tions on write-in voting must be narrowly tailored.1 71
B. A More Correct Application of Anderson
Once the importance of both free choice in elections and the expres-
sive function of voting is acknowledged, it can be seen both that Burdick
improperly applied Anderson, and that the Anderson balancing test
weighs against a ban on write-in voting. Voting is the most basic form of
political expression and voters must have free choice in order to effec-
tively express their views about candidates and issues. 172 Since a ban on
write-in voting severely restricts free choice and speech in elections, a
write-in voting regulation must be narrowly tailored to meet compelling
state interests. Under Anderson, no state interest is sufficiently compel-
ling to outweigh a complete ban on write-in voting.
Applying Anderson first requires consideration of the character and
magnitude of the injury to First Amendment rights. As stated above,
voting provides the most traditional and basic forum for voters to express
political opinions and debate public policy in a robust and open man-
ner. 173 Voting allows citizens to run the government by changing laws,
electing and removing officials, and generally expressing opinions about
current issues through those choices.
Voting for the candidate of one's choice-through write-in voting, if
voters desire to vote for a non-slated candidate-is at the heart of polit-
ical discourse, as it gives voters an effective means of communicating
their ideas and opinions about the state of the government, the slated
167. TRIBE, supra note 66, § 13-10 at 1084.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 23-30.
169. Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698, 705 (1992).
170. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
171. See Norman, 112 S. Ct. at 705.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 145-171.
173. See supra note 147.
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candidates, and the political process in general. The fundamental and
primary values behind the First Amendment are served best by unmono-
polized elections;174 ultimately, strict scrutiny should apply to write-in
voting cases. 175
Anderson secondly requires that once the burden imposed upon vot-
ers' rights is determined, that burden must be weighed against the state's
interests in the regulation. 176 When the burden imposed upon voters is
severe, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a compelling
state interest.177
There is no compelling reason to ban write-in voting. Burdick rec-
ognized a state's interest in avoiding factionalism as a valid state consid-
eration providing adequate justification to ban write-in voting. The
Court has previously recognized other state interests as including voter
confusion and political stability. 178 A state's refusal to recognize write-in
voting, however, does not further these purposes any more than a state's
recognition of write-in voting.
First, the Court in Burdick stated that a write-in voting ban avoids
intra-party feuds and focuses the attention of the voters upon contested
races. 179 Seemingly, this state interest is truly an attempt to avoid sore-
loser candidates and implement voter education about the contested
races. Sore-loser statutes deny a candidate who loses in the primary a
place on the ballot in the general election; a candidate who loses a party
primary may not run as an independent. 180 Direct regulation of the
political parties more directly serve this goal.181 For example, a state
174. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983).
175. In Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989), the Court
stated that "[t]o assess the constitutionality of a state election law, we first examine whether it
burdens rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. If the challenged law
burdens the rights of political parties and their members, it can survive constitutional scrutiny
only if the State shows that it advances a compelling state interest .... Id. at 222 (citations
omitted). While this standard was applied to a case regarding debate over candidate qualifica-
tions, it should be equally applicable to write-in voting cases, which similarly involve free
speech and voting interests.
176. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
177. Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698, 705 (1992).
178. Burnson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1851 (1992) ("[A] State has a compelling inter-
est in protecting voters from confusion and undue influence."); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 32 (1968) (recognizing the substantial state interest in encouraging compromise and polit-
ical stability).
179. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2066 (1992).
180. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 734-35 (1974); see, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6402(a)
(West 1977) ("A candidate whose name has been on the ballot as a candidate of a party at the
direct primary and who has been defeated for that party nomination is ineligible for nomina-
tion as an independent candidate."); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6801 (West 1977) ("A candidate for
whom a nomination paper has been filed as a partisan candidate at a primary election, and who
is defeated for his party nomination at the primary election, is ineligible for nomination as an
independent candidate.").
181. Burdick, 112 S. Ct. at 2071 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
statute forbidding a candidate from running in the general election after
losing in the primary sufficiently protects against sore-loser candi-
dates.18 2 Furthermore, if the state is interested in furthering voter educa-
tion, such an interest could be directly served through publicizing voter
choices rather than by restricting voters from freely choosing a candi-
date: "A State's claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to
make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information [and available
candidates] to them must be viewed with some skepticism."18 3 Indeed,
"today even trivial details about national candidates are instantaneously
communicated nationwide in both verbal and visual form.... [T]he vast
majority of the electorate ... is informed on a day-to-day basis about
events and issues that affect election choices .... ,18 4
Second, state recognition of write-in voting may decrease rather
than increase voter confusion. Voters themselves know for whom they
desire to vote. The voter who wishes to vote for a slated candidate is not
affected by a blank box on the bottom of the ballot; he or she is not
confused because her choice already appears on the ballot. The voter
who wishes to make a different, less traditional choice, but who is con-
fronted with a limited choice, may be more confused and have greater
difficulty in determining how to cast a vote.
Finally, political stability can be better reached by write-in voting
since voters are thus allowed to express their opinion in a legitimate and
positive manner, which could lead to positive change.185 If write-in vot-
ing is not allowed, political stability may be threatened as frustrated vot-
ers attempt to effect political change and express their political opinions
in non-traditional and potentially more dangerous forums and manners.
While a state's interests in avoiding splintered parties and unrestrained
factionalism are important, 8 6 a ban on write-in voting does nothing to
prevent such splintering. Indeed, write-in voting avoids political faction-
alism by allowing free choice, rather than restricting voters to one of two
main parties. In the end, a state's interests in regulating elections are
substantially outweighed by voters' interests in free speech and choice at
the polling booth.
In refuting arguments regarding the importance of write-in voting's
expressive function, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]here are other
182. Thus, the Supreme Court has upheld sore-loser statutes, acknowledging that re-
straining factionalism through such a statute will not damage the election process. Munro v.
Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 (1986).
183. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 798.
184. Id. at 797.
185. See supra text accompanying note 149.
186. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 803 (" '[s]plintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may
do significant damage to the fabric of government ... [but p]olitical competition that draws
resources away from the major parties cannot... be condemned as 'unrestrained factional-
ism.' ") (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974)).
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means available ... to voice such generalized dissension from the electo-
ral process ... ,11 87 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that "Hawaii's election laws do not affect the myriad of other avenues
that are available for propagating one's views and increasing one's influ-
ence." ' 88 What the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit failed to recog-
nize is the importance of the forum in which voters propagate those
views. What more appropriate place for the expression of political opin-
ion than the polling booth? Where else should voters who wish to influ-
ence government change express those views? The political process
allows the American public to ultimately run its government by electing
both government officials and the policies those officials advocate.8 9
Without the freedom to fully express their political views in the polling
booth, American voters are denied their constitutional and basic right to
a government "of the people, for the people, and by the people."
Ultimately, voters' fundamental interest in political expression sub-
stantially outweighs the state's interest in regulating elections. There-
fore, a ban on write-in voting is unconstitutional.
IV. Conclusion
The right to vote, while fundamental, is not absolute. It is qualified
by the state's interest in maintaining elections as fair, honest, and demo-
cratic. However, the state may not regulate elections to the detriment of
a voter's constitutional right to free speech. In Burdick, the Supreme
Court held that a ban on write-in voting did not infringe upon the voter's
right of free speech. Balancing the right to vote and to free speech
against the state's interest in maintaining fair, honest and democratic
elections, the Court found that the ban on write-in voting was a reason-
able means of accomplishing the state's goal. Unfortunately, in making
this decision the Court has denied voters their rights as citizens in a dem-
ocratic society. The Court failed in its weighing process to recognize the
important expressive function of write-in voting.
This Note has argued that voting has both a practical and an expres-
sive function: it allows voters to choose their representatives and to ex-
press their opinions regarding the state of the government and the
political process. Thus, this Note posits that write-in voting should be
available to all voters during elections as a fundamental constitutional
right, which is not outweighed by a state's interest in regulating the time,
place, and manner of elections. This fundamental right must include the
availability of write-in voting, as well as the counting and reporting of
those votes equally with other votes, since without counting and report-
ing the votes are ineffective as political expression.
187. Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S. Ct. 2059, 2067 (1992).
188. Burdick v. Takushi, 937 F.2d 415, 421 (9th Cir. 1991).
189. MCLEAN, supra note 149; see supra text accompanying notes 145-150.
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Ultimately, free choice in elections-whether that choice is exer-
cised by writing in a candidate, voting for a minority party or voting for
an independent candidate-is necessary to allow both the communica-
tion of public opinion and the election of office-holders. In order for
voters to act effectively in their role as communicators of public opinion,
they must be free to exercise their own discretion in choosing the candi-
date for whom to vote. This choice is vital to the health of our political
process as a whole.
As such, the Supreme Court is urged to reconsider its mistaken deci-
sion in Burdick v. Takushi, and hold that write-in voting may not be
constitutionally banned. Protecting voting rights and free speech, ideas
that are "of the essence of a democratic society," 190 requires no less.
190. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
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